Introduction
An excessive cyclicality of bank lending can create a number of potential problems such as exacerbating the business cycle, increasing systemic risk and misallocating lending resources (Berger and Udell, 2004) . As a result, all factors which amplify the cyclicality of bank lending may represent risks to both the macroeconomy and …nancial stability.
Several theories of bank behavior, such as disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1986) , herd behavior (Rajan, 1994) or the institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2004) , highlight the role of banks in the pro-cyclical variations in loan market conditions. Empirical investigations (Asea and Blomberg, 1998; Lown and Morgan, 2006) also show that changes in lending standards imposed by banks increase the cyclicality of bank lending and then amplify the business cycle. Some authors also show that the capital adequacy constraint may lead banks behavior to amplify the credit cycle (Bikker, 2004 , Zicchino, 2005 
However, the literature mentioned above provides only a partial explanation of the stylized facts about cyclicality because it disregards banks' provisioning practices and their links with the cyclicality of bank lending. In this paper, we focus on provisioning rules and their e¤ects on the loan market. In most countries, loan loss provisions are made up of general provisions and speci…c provisions. General provisions refer to probabilistic losses that cannot be supported by loan speci…c documentation. There are therefore highly judgmental and are in many countries subject of regulatory restrictions.
Speci…c provisions refer instead to certain events (such as due payments or other defaultlike events) for which a speci…c documentation can be produced and they are tied by 1 Capital requirements is said to be procyclical because during a downturn capital becomes more expensive and banks often respond by cutting bank lending or shifting towards lower-risk customers. By contrast, in the boom phase, banks can obtain additional capital under more favorable terms, which may give further impetus to their lending. accounting rules to identi…ed problem loans. Such provisioning systems are therefore said to be backward-looking. Speci…c provisions are mainly linked to problem loans and are therefore counter-cyclical 2 . Stylized facts show that total loan loss provisions are negatively a¤ected by the output growth rate (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005) and that the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is highly counter-cyclical (Clerc et al., 2001; Arpa et al., 2001; Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001; Pain, 2003) . This suggests that speci…c provisions are the main determinant of changes in total loan loss provisions 3 .
We consider that such a backward-looking provisioning system represents an unsatisfactory institutional arrangement over a business cycle because expected loan losses are inadequately taken into account, being mainly covered with speci…c provisions when loans turn bad. On the contrary, banks should rather cover their expected loan losses progressively as soon as loans are granted. The gap between loan loss provisions and expected loan losses could a¤ect loan market ‡uctuations, given that loan loss provisions directly a¤ect the cost of bank lending. If banks do not build up loan loss provisions during economic upswings, the cost of loans is understated. Banks have then incentives to ease lending standards. By contrast, during a downturn, the cost of loans is understated if banks had not accumulated loan loss reserves over prior periods to deal with contemporaneous problem loans. Banks can therefore tighten conditions on the loan market.
A forward-looking provisioning system, also called a dynamic or statistical provision-ing system 4 , could provide a satisfactory institutional arrangement to cover expected loan losses. In such a system, a new element, called the statistical provisions, is introduced aside from speci…c and general provisions. These statistical provisions are de…ned by accounting rules to cover expected losses. Banks have to evaluate the latent risk over a whole business cycle of their loan portfolio. Statistical provisions are de…ned as the di¤erence between the estimation of latent losses and speci…c provisions. During an upswing phase, speci…c provisions are generally low and banks can therefore build up a fund of statistical provisions. Conversely, during a downturn, speci…c provisions increase and can be greater than latent losses, which means that the fund of statistical provisions previously accumulated is used to cope with numerous contemporaneous problem loans. As a result, statistical provisions o¤set the counter-cyclical evolutions of speci…c provisions, and total loan loss provisions are smoothed over time 5 .
The cyclicality of provisioning systems has already been investigated from an empirical point of view (Borio et al. 2001; Clerc et al., 2001; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005 for example), as well as the impact of such cyclicality on bank lending Lepetit, 2008 and . However, there is no theoretical model, to our knowledge, which examines the e¤ects of loan loss provisions on the loan market. This paper is an attempt to …ll this gap in the literature. More precisely, we develop a partial equilibrium model of a banking …rm to analyze how provisioning rules in ‡uence loan market ‡uctuations.
We show that a backward-looking provisioning system ampli…es the pro-cyclicality of loan market ‡uctuations. We demonstrate that, in a forward-looking provisioning system 4 See Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) , Mann and Michael (2002) and Jiménez and Saurina (2006) for more details about the forward-looking provisioning system. Such a system has been implemented in Spain since 2000. 5 Therefore, statistical provisions are an alternative to discretionary loan loss provisions made for income smoothing. Indeed, Pérez et al. (2008) show that the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system in Spain reduced the income smoothing behavior.
where statistical provisions are used to smooth the evolution of total loan loss provisions, the issue of pro-cyclicality of loan market ‡uctuations does not exist. Our results support the recent call of the Basel Committee for the implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system to address procyclicality (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. The optimal behavior of the bank under the di¤erent provisioning systems is presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The model
We develop a partial equilibrium model of a representative banking …rm. We assume that the representative bank i (i = 1; :::; N ) is specialized in loans of type i. Specialization can refer to a type of borrower, sector or to a geographical area (Carletti et al., 2007) . The representative bank i supply therefore only loans of type i and operates in a monopolistic competition market. We also assume that the bank i faces an exogenous business cycle.
Our aim is to explicitly introduce bank provisioning behavior. Three provisioning systems are considered. Firstly, we consider a strict backward-looking provisioning system in which loan loss provisions are triggered by past due payments. In such a system, the bank evaluates its credit risk exposure over the short run (i.e. on current non performing loans) and then sets loan rates depending on economic conditions. Secondly, we examine a forward-looking provisioning system in which loan loss provisions consist of two components: one related to past due payments and another one related to expected losses in order to o¤set the counter-cyclical behavior of the …rst component. In this case, credit risk exposure is assessed over a whole business cycle. This implies that the determination of loan rates is less a¤ected by economic conditions. Finally, we consider the capital bu¤er system where the representative bank applies backward-looking provisioning rules and uses a capital bu¤er in order to cover expected losses which are not covered by loan loss provisions. The model allows comparison of the bank's behavior on the loan market in these three provisioning systems 6 . As the loan rate depends on the provisioning rules, the Modigliani-Miller theorem breaks down and then the choice of accounting methods matters for real decisions.
Activities of the bank and pro…t function
The representative bank i performs an intermediation activity 7 . We assume that banks supply long-term loans with a ‡exible interest rate 8 . Its asset side is made up of loans (L i;t ) and a safe assets (S i;t ). As the loan portfolio contains expected loan losses, loan loss reserves (LLR i;t ) are deducted from assets. Loans minus loan loss reserves are called net loans (Walter, 1991) . The liability side is made up of debts 9 (D i;t ) and equity (K i;t ).
The bank balance sheet identity is
(1) 6 We do not include general provisions in our model, as they do not matter to modelize the countercyclicality of loan loss provisions (Clerc et al., 2001; Arpa et al., 2001; Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001; Pain, 2003) . 7 The model is written at time t. 8 We assume a ‡exible interest rate on loans for computational simplicity. 9 As in Van den Heuvel (2002), bank's liabilities include deposits as well as market debt. Moreover, we assume that all debt liabilities are covered by deposit insurance and that the deposit insurance premium is equal to zero. Therefore, the banks'debt-funding costs do not depend on the debt equity ratio and probability of bankruptcy. The explicit introduction of a positive deposit insurance premium would not alter any result relative to the bank provisioning behavior.
We assume that equity and loan loss reserves are invested in safe assets such as government bonds 10 , so that
(2)
The safe asset is supposed to be a short term investment of one period. This assumption assures that equity and loan loss reserves are liquid and available to face losses.
The pro…t of bank i ( i;t ) comes from its intermediation activity
where r L i;t is the interest rate on loans, r M t is the risk-free interest rate applied to debts and safe assets, y t is output, functions J(y t ) and G(y t ) represent respectively the fraction of non performing loans (i.e. problem loans) and the fraction of charged-o¤ loans 11 , LLP i;t represents loan loss provisions and L i;t G(y t ) represents unanticipated charge-o¤s (i.e. charge-o¤s for which the bank did not set aside loan loss reserves) 12 . The fractions of 10 Not all government bonds can be considered as safe assets, particularly with the sovereign debt crisis undergone by some countries. But we consider that bonds underwriten by some countries such as Germany and the United-States can be considered as safer. However, the German euro denominated bonds can no longer be regarded as totally riskless given their exposure to the sovereign debt crisis of some European countries. The US dollar denominated bonds of the United-States are also not totally riskless due to the credit risk of the municipalities and the importance of national debt which exceeds 80% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009 ). Further, non-in ‡ation indexed bonds face in ‡ation risks, and countries whose exchange rates are not pegged to the euro or the USD will also face exchange rate risks if they hold reserves in German or US bonds. 11 Charged-o¤ loans occur when debts are uncollectible and are removed from the balance sheet. 12 The loan portfolio is made up of three loan categories during period t: (i ) good loans, (ii ) problem loans and (iii ) charged-o¤ loans. As we will see during the calibration of the model based mainly on the database Bankscope Fitch IBCA, most loans are good loans. Loans judged likely to produce a loss are classi…ed as problem loans. Recognized losses are classi…ed as charged-o¤ loans. Most of these charged-o¤ loans were classi…ed as problem loans over prior periods. But some loans can directly move from category (i ) to category (iii ). If the bank did not make loan loss reserves on them, they are called unanticipated charge-o¤s. We assume for simplicity that is constant. We could consider that this parameter is a¤ected by a shock when numerous or few loans are directly move from category (i ) to category (iii ) but this point is out of the scope of the paper. non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans are de…ned by
where j 0 and g 0 are respectively the steady state fraction (or average fraction over a whole business cycle) of non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans per period, y t =y represents the output gap (y is therefore the steady state output and y t the current output), > 0
and ! > 0 are the elasticities with respect to the output gap, and z t and v t represent shocks with mean one and standard deviation z and v 13 . The output gap a¤ects the …nancial situation of …rms and households and therefore negatively a¤ects the fraction of non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans. The shocks z t and v t underline that non performing loans and charged-o¤ loans are not fully predictable even if the output gap is known. In addition, we do not assume that non performing loans and charged-o¤ loans depend on the interest rate charged by the bank. The model does not focus on problems of moral hazard or adverse selection in the loan market 14 .
Equation (3) states that the bank pro…t comes from the interest rate on loans. However, interest earnings accrued but not received on problem loans and on charged-o¤ loans during the period are subtracted from earnings. The bank receives therefore interest only on the proportion (1 J(y t ) G(y t )) of its loan portfolio: The fraction (1 ) of charged-o¤ loans had been provisioned over prior periods and does not a¤ect current earnings, whereas unanticipated charged-o¤ loans ( L i;t G(y t )) are subtracted from earnings since 13 These shocks will be speci…ed during the calibration of the model. 14 We can also note than we do not assume that charged-o¤ loans depend explicitly on last period's nonperforming loans because some loans can directly move from the good loans category to the charged-o¤ loans category and also because the fraction of nonperforming loans which move into the charged-o¤ loans category is not necessarily the same for each period. they represent recognized losses which had not been anticipated. The bank has to pay for debts (r M t D i;t ). In addition, loan loss provisions (LLP i;t ) are charged against earnings to account for expected losses covered during the current period 15 . We can therefore see from equation (3) that provisioning rules in ‡uence the bank's pro…t.
Pro…ts are shared between retained earnings (K i;t+1 K i;t ) used to modify the level of equity and dividends paid out to shareholders ( i;t )
Negatives dividends operate as equity issuing, and retained earnings are used to comply with the risk-based capital requirement which can be written as
where k 0 is the regulatory threshold (the tier 1 requirement is 4% in Basel I) and we assume a risk weight on loans of one. We assume for simplicity that this regulatory constraint (equation (7)) is always binding; banks hold the minimum regulatory capital required 16 . Equation (6) shows that the choice between dividends and retained earnings is intertemporal. The level of capital at the beginning of the period K i;t is considered as given and the level of retained earnings chosen by the bank gives the level of capital available for the next period (K i;t+1 ). The risk-based capital requirement is therefore written for period t + 1.
15 Our variable LLP i;t has three di¤erent speci…cations according to the provisioning system considered (see section 2.2). 16 This simpli…cation allows us to focus on bank provisioning behavior. However, it could also be interesting in a further developement to examine the e¤ects of the capital requirement on the banks' lending behavior. For example, Fur…ne (2001) considers in his model the cost of equity issuing and the cost related to a binding capital constraint in order to specify how the bank sets its equities.
Provisioning rules
Provisioning rules are de…ned by the banking regulator. These rules can be backwardlooking, i.e. based on current non performing loans, or forward-looking, i.e. speci…ed in order to smooth provisions made by the bank over a whole business cycle. In addition, if the bank believes that not enough loan loss provisions have been done according to regulatory requirements, the bank can hold a capital bu¤er.
We consider three speci…cations of the model according to provisioning rules and practices : a strict backward-looking provisioning system, a forward-looking provisioning system and a capital bu¤er system 17 .
The strict backward-looking provisioning system
The …rst provisioning system is a strict backward-looking provisioning system in which the bank strictly implements the backward-looking provisioning rules. The analysis of the bank's lending behavior in such a system will allow us to highlight the role of loan loss provisions in the pro-cyclical variation in loan market conditions. We therefore assume that the bank uses the accounting pro…t in its optimizing behavior and does not try to o¤set the weaknesses of the backward-looking accounting rules to determine the economic pro…t.
In a backward-looking provisioning system, loan loss provisions are driven by non performing loans. Loan loss reserves …t therefore identi…ed problem loans rather than expected loan losses 18 . Loan loss provisions are de…ned as following
where L i;t reprents the loans, y t is the current output, h 0 is the steady state fraction (or average fraction over a whole business cycle) of non performing loans (L i;t J(y t )) which are covered by loan loss provisions during a period.
This speci…cation ensures a counter-cyclical evolution of loan loss provisions which is the main stylized fact in a backward-looking provisioning system (see Clerc et al., 2001; Arpa et al., 2001; Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001 and Pain, 2003) . Identi…ed problem loans underestimate expected loan losses during an economic expansion and the bank has to make numerous loan loss provisions during the downturn. This system has therefore a pro-cyclical e¤ect on bank pro…ts.
The forward-looking provisioning system
In the forward-looking provisioning system, the accounting rules require that the bank make loan loss provisions related both to past due payments and to expected losses. Total loan loss provisions are therefore smoothed over time and loan loss reserves …t expected losses of the loan portfolio. Loan loss provisions in the forward-looking provisioning system are de…ned as follow
where H F (L i;t ) represents total loan loss provisions 19 . Loan loss provisions are smoothed around the steady state expected loss per period (h 0 L i;t j 0 ). The counter-cyclicality of non performing loans related to the business cycle is not relevant anymore to determine loan loss provisions. As a result, economic pro…t and accounting pro…t are the same in such a system, as expected losses are perfectly taken into account by accounting rules.
The capital bu¤er system
In the capital bu¤er system, backward-looking provisioning rules are implemented but the bank takes into account the weaknesses of this accounting practice and tries to evaluate its economic pro…t. We assume that the bank builds a capital bu¤er (KB t ) to cover the expected losses which are not covered by loan loss reserves 20 . The law of motion of the capital bu¤er is de…ned by
The amount ( H F (L i;t ) H B (L i;t ; y t )) represents the di¤erence between loan loss provisions in the forward-looking provisioning system and loan loss provisions in the backwardlooking provisioning system, i.e. provisions related to expected losses. A fraction 2 [0; 1] is added to the capital bu¤er. For example, if problem loans are low ( H F (L i;t ) > H B (L i;t ; y t )), expected losses over period t are understated in the backward-looking provi-19 H F (L i;t ) reprents the sum of the two components of loan loss provisions, one related to past due payments and the other one related to expected losses. The latter component is therefore equal to h 0 L i;t j 0 (1 (y t =y) ! z t ): As a result, provisions in the forward-looking system do not explicitly depend on statistical prediction of non performing loans at period t + 1. Rules are speci…ed in order to smooth provisions made by the bank over a whole business cycle. 20 Banks hold more prudential capital than that required by regulators, with a total capital bu¤ers (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) on average across the EU15 of 2.93 per cent over the period 1997 -2004 (Jokipii and Milne, 2006 . Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks hold excess capital (Jokipii and Milne, 2006) . One of these explanations is that capital bu¤ers can be used to cover expected future losses. In the model we do not make the distinction between Tier 1 capital and general provisions (which are included in Tier 2 capital). They are considered as equivalent in the capital bu¤er hold by the bank. sioning system and then the bank increases the capital bu¤er by ( H F (L i;t ) H B (L i;t ; y t )) to obtain a better estimate of its economic pro…t 21 . The capital bu¤er is added to standard equity (K i;t ). We de…ne therefore total capital (T K i;t ) as
Then, the bank balance sheet becomes
We assume that the capital bu¤er is invested in safe assets (S i;t ) so that
The bank's ‡ow budget constraint is given by
Loan demand
We assumed that the representative bank i operates in a monopolistic competition market. Banks o¤er di¤erentiated loans and then each bank faces a speci…c demand for its type of loans. Based on Henzel et al. (2007) and Carletti et al. (2007) , we de…ne this 21 The parameter is exogenous in the model. We do not specify the bank's incentive to build up a capital bu¤er. The capital bu¤er system is simply considered as an alternative to the forward-looking provisioning system. speci…c loan demand as
where L t is the aggregated demand for loans, r L t is the average interest rate on loans, is the elasticity of L i;t with respect to the interest rate on loans and is the bank market share (with = 1=N ). The parameter represents therefore an inverse measure of the bank monopolistic power.
The bank maximization behavior
We assume that the bank maximizes the present discounted value of future dividends.
The bank's maximization problem consists of choosing the interest on loans (r L i;t ). In the backward-looking provisioning system, the maximization problem is written as
subject to equations (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8), and (15), and where is a standard discount factor 22 . In the forward-looking provisioning system, equation (8) is replaced with equation (9). In the capital bu¤er system, the bank maximization problem is the same than in the backward-looking provisioning system except that: (i) equations (10),
(11) are added as constraints; (ii) equations (1) and (2) are replaced with equations (12) 22 We assume that the discount factor is constant and does not depend on the cost of equity. and (13); (iii) dividends are given by equation (14).
Optimal interest rate on loans
The …rst order condition (FOC) gives the optimal interest rate on loans. We obtain in the backward-looking provisioning system (details are available upon request)
As the bank earns interest only on a fraction of their loans (1 J(y t ) G(y t )), the lefthand side of equation (18) represents the marginal return on loans. The right-hand side of equation (18) shows that several factors in ‡uence the bank when setting the loan interest rate. More precisely, the bank applies a mark-up ( =( 1)) on the marginal cost of its lending activity.
There are four components in the marginal cost of the bank's lending activity : the cost of debt (r M t ), the provisioning cost (h 0 J(y t )), the unanticipated charge-o¤s cost ( G(y t )) and the cost related to the capital requirement ((k 0 = k 0 )). Anticipated recognized losses had been provisioned over prior periods and do not a¤ect the current pro…t. As a result, provisioning rules (i.e. the rules according to which losses are anticipated) matter in the optimal decision concerning the loan interest rate. In the strict backward-looking system, loan loss provisions depend mainly on problem loans and then the provisioning cost is negatively a¤ected by the business cycle.
This e¤ect of provisioning rules on the loan rate is di¤erent in the forward-looking provisioning system. The FOC is given by
Provisions related to expected losses o¤set the counter-cyclical evolution of provisions related to past due payments, so that loan loss provisions are no more a¤ected by the counter-cyclical evolutions of problem loans. As a result, the marginal provisioning cost is given by h 0 j 0 .
In the capital bu¤er system, the bank applies backward-looking provisioning rules and creates a capital bu¤er to cover the expected loan losses which are not covered by loan loss reserves. The optimal decision regarding the interest rate on loans is given by
The di¤erences between equations (19) and (20) show that the bank's behavior is identical in the capital bu¤er system and the forward-looking provisioning system only if = 1.
Under this condition, the expected losses not covered by loan loss reserves are fully covered by the capital bu¤er. However, a high capital bu¤er requires that the bank uses retained earnings to increase its capitalization instead of increasing dividends during economic upswings. Shareholders may not appreciate such a strategy and may demand higher dividends (and then < 1). Banks may therefore not be able to completely o¤set the counter-cyclical evolution of loan loss provisions by building a capital bu¤er.
The forward-looking provisioning system presents the advantage to require banks to also make provisions related to expected losses that smooth the evolution of total loan loss provisions.
Business cycle and loan market
We can see with equations (18), (19) and (20) that the interest rate on loans is the same in the three provisioning systems when considering the steady state. It is given by 23
where r L and r M represent respectively the steady state value of the loan interest rate and of the interest rate on debts.
However, the short term dynamics in the loan market are di¤erent for the three provisioning systems. These dynamics can be appreciated by log-linearizing the …rst order condition on the interest rate on loans (equations (18), (19) and (20)). We also introduce the aggregate loan demand. Based on the work of Calza et al. (2006) , the aggregate loan demand is as following 24
where t is the in ‡ation rate. The aggregate loan demand increases when output increases, and decreases when the real loan rate increases.
In the backward-looking provisioning system, the log-linearization of equation (18) is given by (details are available upon request)
where ' 0 r L (1 j 0 g 0 ); ' 1 Zr M ; ' 2 r L j 0 +Zh 0 j 0 ; ' 3 r L g 0 +Z g 0 ; ' 4 !' 2 + ' 3 and Z =( 1).
The loan market dynamics depend on several factors. First, deviations of the loan rate (r L t ) around its steady state depend on deviations of the interest rate on debt (r M t ).
Variations in …nancing costs are therefore passed on to the loan rate and lead to changes in loans (L t ) as we can see from equation (22).
Second, shocks on problem loans (ẑ t ) and on charged-o¤ loans (v t ) positively a¤ect the loan rater L t . We have an increase in credit risk in case of positive shocks, which leads to an increase in the loan rate and then to a decrease in loans. The e¤ect of a charged-o¤ loans shock onr L t is measured by the parameter ' 3 . This parameter is made up of two components and suggests that an increase in the fraction of charged-o¤ loans impacts onr L t because the bank faces (i) a decrease in interest earnings (r L g 0 ) and (ii) an unanticipated loss (Z g 0 ). Similarly, the e¤ect of a non performing loans shock is measured by the parameter ' 2 : An increase in the fraction of non performing loans leads to both a decrease in interest earnings (r L j 0 ) and to an increase of provisions (Zh 0 j 0 ), as suggested by the two components of the parameter ' 2 :
Third, the business cycle (ŷ t ) negatively a¤ects the loan rater L t . This e¤ect is measured by the parameter ' 4 !' 2 + ' 3 . The business cycle a¤ects the bank's behavior through its impact on the levels of non performing loans and of charged-o¤ loans. An economic downturn implies an increase in problem loans and charged-o¤ loans, leading to an increase in the loan rate. This reinforces the direct e¤ect of the business cycle on loans, measured by the parameter y in equation (22).
Equations (22) and (23) show therefore that the provisioning system matters in the loan market dynamics. Provisions are driven by problem loans in a backward-looking provisioning system. These provisioning rules amplify the e¤ects of the business cycle (ŷ t ) and of a non performing loans shock (ẑ t ) on the loan market. This ampli…cation e¤ect is measured by Zh 0 j 0 in the parameter ' 2 .
Proposition 1:
A backward-looking provisioning system ampli…es the e¤ect of the business cycle on the loan market. The magnitude of this e¤ect depends on the impact of the business cycle on loan loss provisions.
This magnifying e¤ect of loan loss provisions on the loan market is no more relevant in a forward-looking provisioning system where loan loss provisions do not only depend on problem loans. The log-linearization of the FOC on the loan interest rate (equation (19)) is given by
where ' 0 2 r L j 0 and ' 0
The e¤ect of a non performing loans shock is smaller in the forward-looking provisioning system (' 0 2 < ' 2 ). The e¤ect of the business cycle is also smaller (' 0 4 < ' 4 ). The deviations of the loan rate as well as the ‡uctuations in the loan market are therefore less important in a forward-looking provisioning system where provisions related to past due payments do not longer a¤ect the bank's behavior since their variations are o¤set by provisionsmade to cover expected losses.
Proposition 2:
The provisioning rules do not amplify the e¤ect of the business cycle on the loan market in a forward-looking provisioning system.
The third provisioning system that we considered is the capital bu¤er system. The log-linearized FOC on the loan rate (equation (20)) is given by
where ' 00 2 r L j 0 + Z(1 )h 0 j 0 and ' 00 4 !' 00 2 + ' 3 :
If is equal to 1, the capital bu¤er and loan loss reserves are mixed to fully cover expected losses. In this case, the behavior of the bank is the same as in the forwardlooking provisioning system (' 00 2 = ' 0 2 and ' 00 4 = ' 0 4 ) and provisioning rules do not amplify the e¤ect of the business cycle 25 . However, the constraint = 1 requires the bank to accumulate a capital bu¤er during the economic expansion which will be used during the downturn.
Proposition 3:
The use of a capital bu¤er to cover the expected losses o¤sets the e¤ect of the business cycle on provisions; however, this might imply a high ‡uctuation in the capital of the bank.
Concluding remarks
Our model shows that accounting rules on loan loss provisions matter to explain loan market ‡uctuations. We …nd that a backward-looking provisioning system ampli…es the pro-cyclicality of bank lending. Such an e¤ect is removed in a forward-looking provisioning system where statistical provisions smooth total loan loss provisions over the business cycle. This e¤ect can also be removed with a capital bu¤er system, but this solution might imply large variations in banks' equity. Our work therefore shows that 25 If = 0; we also note that ' 00 2 = ' 2 and ' 00 4 = ' 4 . the capital requirement is not the only institutional constraint which may amplify the cyclicality of lending. Accounting rules on loan loss provisions are also a decisive factor to explain the pro-cyclicality of banks'behavior. A strict backward-looking provisioning system contributes to amplify the cyclicality of bank lending and a capital bu¤er cannot easily remove this e¤ect. In Europe, the provisioning system is backward-looking (excluding Spain) but banks do not implement these accounting rules strictly. Consequently, for practical purposes, European banks behave as if in a capital bu¤er system in which banks can try to o¤set weaknesses of backward-looking provisioning rules. Clerc et al. (2001) highlight that such a system leads to a procyclical evolution of the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. It means that European banks do not succeed in o¤setting weaknesses of backward-looking provisioning rules by covering expected losses with equity or discretionary loan loss provisions.
The conclusions from this paper support the recent call of the Basel Committee for the implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system to address procyclicality. More precisely, the reform programme developed by the Basel Committee and referred as "Basel III" stresses the importance of implementing a capital bu¤er system and a forward-looking provisioning system as prudential measures to mitigate procyclicality in the banking sector (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). But such a reform requires a change of accounting standards towards an expected loss approach. In this regard, the Committee is working closely with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to reform the Fair Value Accounting system based on IAS 39. The objective is to reform "the accounting model for provisioning to allow early identi…cation and recognition of losses by incorporating a broader ranger of available credit information than presently included in the incurred loss model" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009).
The implementation of a such model that allows earlier recognition of credit losses will build up the level of provisions at an earlier point in time and will decrease the cyclicality of lending; this could help …nancial institutions to cope better with potential future crises.
